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‘“We Need Not Be Ashamed of our own Economic Profit Motive”: Britain, Latin 
America, and the Alliance for Progress, 1959-1963’ 
 
In September 2010, columnist Julian Glover called for Britain to expand its trade with the 
countries of Latin America. Britain, he wrote, ‘needs to trade with those parts of the world that 
are getting richer.’ Latin America was one such place—a place where, in the past, Britain had 
established powerful financial links but which had, in more recent times, fallen by the wayside. 
‘Things were once different,’ he continued. ‘Britain played a noble part in the liberation of the 
continent from Spanish rule... somehow, in the 20th century, we gave up, diverted by the places 
we tried to rule. We still are. A fraction of the political and economic effort being applied to 
Afghanistan or Africa could transform Britain's standing in Latin America.’ ‘Out across the 
Atlantic,’ he concluded, ‘there is a continent that would like to be a friend and partner to Britain, 
a still-respected alternative to what Latin Americans see as the imposition of North 
American capitalismo salvaje—wild capitalism, exploitation from the north.’1 
 In Whitehall, fifty years earlier, this very debate had been at the centre of British 
discussions over what, if anything, they should do to bolster their presence in Latin America.2 
For some officials, especially those in the Treasury, Britain’s parlous financial situation and pre-
existing commitments to the Commonwealth precluded any hopes of expanding into the 
Americas. For other officials, particularly on the American desk in the Foreign Office, the area 
was believed to provide a distinct opportunity for expanding Britain’s financial and commercial 
standing without expending too much money.  
Yet it was not just financial considerations that shaped British thinking, even though 
these were of prime importance. Indeed, as these debates unfolded at great length between 1959 
and 1963, they were influenced by three inter-related, but nevertheless distinct, factors: the 
position of the West in the Cold War, calculations over the future of Anglo-American relations, 
and more basic considerations as to whether it was in London’s interests to expend any 
diplomatic and economic capital in the area. Crucially, it was only when these three positions 
were aligned—when it benefited the West’s position in the Cold War, when it was compatible 
with shifting patterns in relations between Washington and London, and when it was seen to be 
a worthwhile investment of British influence—that any real momentum for an expanded British 
role started to develop. Even then, however, any signs of progress were slow to emerge. For 
much of the period under consideration, in fact, the arguments against expanding the British role 
were at least as strong, if not more so, than those for it. It was only in late-1962 and early in the 
following year that any wider support for a change in policy started to take shape. Moreover, it 
was only in 1966—some seven years after the issue had first begun to be discussed seriously—
that the UK sanctioned the expenditure of £4 million in developmental funding in the area. 
 It is this interplay between the different factors guiding British thinking that explain why 
the course of British policy-making toward Latin America was so arduous. Furthermore, this 
helps to demonstrate why two seemingly vital factors—the desire of US officials to secure 
British support for their policies, and the position of the West in the Cold War—were not 
enough to prompt a change in direction despite persistent attempts by the Foreign Office to 
make the case on this basis.3 Both of these factors would be important, to be sure, but they 
would not be enough to dislodge the steadfast stance adopted by the Treasury. 
 Latin America had been an area of increasing Cold War concern for US policymakers 
since the culmination of the Cuban Revolution in 1959.4 The inauguration of John F. Kennedy 
in 1961, whose administration believed the US had been too timid in seeking to court the 
countries of the region in economic terms, led to the announcement of the Alliance for Progress 
(AFP)—a vast, multi-billion funding project whose intention was to help the countries of the 
area to become modern economic societies within a decade and, thus, to secure their allegiance 
to the western cause in the struggle against Soviet communism.5 Part of this process, albeit only a 
minor one, was to try and secure European—and, in particular, British and West German—
diplomatic and financial backing for the Alliance.6 This resulted, as we shall see, in ongoing 
attempts to solicit British support for the Alliance. At times, this was in the form of requests for 
a diplomatic show of support; at other times, it was a call for an indication that Britain was 
prepared to commit financially; at still other times, it was part of a wider effort to obtain 
European backing for the Alliance in an effort to dissipate concerns that it was merely another 
phase of US predominance in the area. These efforts played a significant part in helping to move 
British deliberations toward the acceptance of a more engaged policy in the area, yet not to the 
extent that they would enable the Foreign Office to persuade the Treasury that British policy 
should be altered. Officials across Whitehall, in fact, were concerned that any move on this front 
would be deemed unsatisfactory by the Latin Americans and might, in fact, do more harm than 
good given Britain’s shortage of financial resources. Nor did the fact that some of Britain’s 
competitors were more willing to invest in the area—West Germany, chiefly, but also France, 
Italy and Japan—prompt an immediate shift in policy. Again, such trends were deemed 
worrisome but they were not enough to initiate a response.  
What was needed, therefore, was a third element: a growing belief that it was in Britain’s 
political and financial interest to explore a change in policy toward Latin America more fully. 
This took much longer to take shape. Within the Foreign Office there had long been a sense that 
a small investment—as little as £10 million some officials suggested—could do much to improve 
Britain’s foreign economic outlook. But within the Treasury such a figure, while miniscule 
compared to the US commitment to the AFP, was deemed to be more than the Exchequer could 
bear. Eventually, this position began to shift and there was greater confidence in the idea that it 
would be within London’s interests to channel funds to Latin America. As wider enthusiasm for 
the Empire began to ebb, the British polity more generally was disposed to consider the Western 
Hemisphere as a promising area for potential expansion.7 
 Presently, there is no existing study of British policy toward the Alliance for Progress in 
this era. This is not altogether surprising as, even on the US side, the field is only just starting to 
take shape as scholars confront the enormous difficulty of trying to decipher how they write 
authoritative works on this era that are both focused enough to deal with the complexity of the 
AFP and broad enough to get a detailed understanding of the way that it worked in over twenty 
Latin American countries.8 However, examining these events is nonetheless important as it sheds 
light on the intricacies of Anglo-American relations during the Cold War and, also, highlights the 
complex factors that fed into British decision-making toward areas in the global south that were 
not former imperial possessions. While numerous works on US-UK relations during this era 
have focused on whether or not they were positive or negative, the present article suggests that 
they were less straightforward than existing accounts suggest.9 Whereas the focus of existing 
studies has understandably tended to be on areas or moments of crisis, this article depicts the 
multi-layered elements that shaped British policy toward an area of prime US influence but in 
which London’s stake was comparatively small.10 London did not immediately respond to US 
requests for assistance; nor did they mobilise when the case was persuasively made that the area 
now posed a substantive threat to the West’s position in the Cold War. Both of these elements 
made a change in British thinking more likely and featured heavily in evolving discussions, but it 
was only when a shift was also deemed to accord with London’s own interests that a change in 
attitude became apparent. For British officials, it transpired, investing in Latin America only 
seemed a viable option once it met political, diplomatic, strategic and, perhaps most importantly, 
economic goals. 
**** 
British interests in Latin America, both political and economic, had been in decline since the 
nineteenth century and the setting out of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823. As US efforts to enforce 
the doctrine became more vigorous in the late nineteenth century, and notions of it being an area 
of prevailing US dominance become more commonplace, Britain’s once thriving interests there 
quickly began to dissipate. By 1914, in fact, they were coming under sustained pressure in the 
face of the inexorable growth of US power in the area and the determined efforts of Latin 
American nationalists.11 A Foreign Office assessment in 1953, by way of indicating how far this 
shift had gone by the early Cold War, portrayed the area as one where the United States was 
considered to be the predominant power.12 It was a point reaffirmed—none too subtly—by the 
Dwight D. Eisenhower administration in 1954 during international discussions over a possible 
US incursion into Guatemala to help remove the government of Jacobo Arbenz. When word 
reached the White House that British diplomats were undecided about whether or not to 
support a Guatemalan complaint to the UN about US actions, the administration responded 
with an imperial comparison whose meaning was patently clear to UK officials. If the British did 
not back Washington’s position, Eisenhower’s secretary of state told the ambassador to the UN, 
then the US ‘would feel entirely free without regard to their position in relation to any such 
matters as any of their colonial problems in Egypt, Cyprus etc.’13 
 Yet, by 1959, that view was starting to shift and British officials were once again starting 
to believe that the area might offer opportunities if London was ever minded to try and expand 
its interests overseas. News that a free trade area (LAFTA) was on the cusp of being created in 
Latin America prompted serious discussions about the nature of the British position there late in 
that year. While British financial interests in the area paled in comparison to those in Europe, a 
Board of Trade report made clear in November, they nevertheless remained significant. ‘Last 
year, the UK sold £153 million worth of goods to Latin America,’ the report noted, ‘representing 
4.6 per cent of total UK exports and 5.2. per cent of Latin American imports from all sources.’ 
The report recommended that the UK should ‘continue to encourage them’ and aim to ensure 
that ‘the developments are on sound lines.’14 Upon completion the report was sent to the Prime 
Minister, Harold Macmillan, who, after reading it, told his private secretary that ‘this was 
certainly a development which must be watched.’15  
In the months that followed, the Treasury sought to determine whether or not they 
believed LAFTA would prove advantageous. One official, while wary, noted that its creation 
‘should not have an adverse effect on our trade...indeed it should increase it.’16 Other officials, 
though, were more concerned at the prospect of giving their support and running the risk of 
‘being too soft on the Latin Americans.’17 The Bank of England, meanwhile, was opposed to the 
idea. The area’s entrenched economic problems, a Bank official wrote, would mean that 
LAFTA’s implementation would cause ‘UK products...to suffer from discriminatory treatment.’ 
Equally, the move was likely to benefit Britain’s competitors as those ‘industrial countries with a 
greater capacity or present propensity to invest in Latin America (e.g. the US, Germany and 
Japan) may gain at the expense of the UK.’18 
 Throughout these discussions it was clear that it was largely economic considerations 
shaping British thinking. But the direction of these deliberations was about to be challenged by 
the worsening state of US relations with the area. Tensions had been rising in inter-American 
relations for much of the post-1945 era as Latin American discontent with US intervention and 
economic policies became more entrenched. By the end of the 1950s, though, these tensions had 
erupted with greater force as evidenced by the protests that greeted vice president Richard Nixon 
on a tour of the region in 1958 and, early the next year, the emergence of Fidel Castro’s 
government in Cuba espousing a powerful anti-American line in hemispheric rhetoric.19 These 
events, unsurprisingly, began to affect British appraisals of the area. As the Eisenhower 
administration strove to engineer an improvement in inter-American relations, British observers 
recognised that these events would also influence their own approach toward the area. 
In early 1960, President Eisenhower had conducted a mini-tour of the area in an effort to 
cultivate closer relations. Following the trip, though, some British officials argued that its initial 
success could soon wear off. ‘There is a fairly wide-spread inclination to sum up the result of the 
tour by saying “so what?”’ Harold Caccia, the British Ambassador in Washington, reported to 
London. ‘As an exercise in public relations, on the part of the US, it has no doubt been amply 
justified. But its success carries with it its own dangers. There is a risk of disillusionment if it is 
not followed by new and striking policies.’20 Eisenhower’s advisors agreed. Accordingly, in July, 
Eisenhower announced a $500 million social progress fund to alleviate chronic poverty in the 
region.21 In the British view, however, such moves would not serve to placate Latin American 
discontent.22 Overall, British observers at a meeting in Bogota to finalise the social progress fund 
noted, the Latin Americans were ‘reasonably satisfied’ by the Eisenhower administration’s move. 
But they had also given notice that ‘once US presidential elections are over’ they would ‘hope 
that “a fund for economic development will be created with the participation also of other 
capital exporting countries notably in Europe”.’23 
At the same time, the discussions that had begun over the impact that LAFTA might 
have had prompted further discussions in London over the viability of the British government 
seeking to bolster its commercial presence in the area. This was particularly evident in the 
Foreign Office where, in the first half of 1960, there was a determined attempt to counter the 
Treasury’s negativity over Latin America by issuing a paper on British policy in the area—a move 
that, in the weeks and months that followed, drew out the differences between Treasury and the 
Foreign Office, and which set the tone for the larger moves that would take place after 1961. 
Even in the Foreign Office, it is worth noting, there were signs that officials recognised 
the divergence between what they would like to do in Latin America and what in practice they 
would be able to do. An initial draft of the Foreign Office report, which emerged in February, 
had highlighted substantial benefits to the UK in boosting its economic position in Latin 
America. Washington’s declining influence, it noted, ‘has left a gap into which the European 
business-men and investor can step.’ The US would continue to be the dominant power in the 
region, of course, but it was nevertheless believed that many Latin American countries ‘would 
now welcome European investment as opposed to American and even, perhaps, offer it more 
favourable terms.’24  
Upon reading this, however, several Foreign Office officials noted their dissatisfaction 
with its recommendations. Its inherent problem, H.A. Hankey wrote, was that ‘after making an 
overwhelming case in favour of some far reaching policy change in order to restore our position 
in Latin America, the draft really ends with a whimper—suggesting making, what are after all, 
relatively not very far reaching political recommendations and virtually recommending on the 
economic side that we should do what is really already being done about up to the limit of what 
can be done.’25 A further revision of the report did little to dispel this feeling. Hankey 
understood perfectly well that the Commonwealth had to come first, he wrote after seeing the 
new draft, but they were nevertheless determined to make the case that it was ‘ever clearer that 
the actual aid given by e.g. Germany and France, of the kind we do not allow, is relatively small’ 
but that because ‘it is presented well it produces a disproportionate effect.’ Britain could keep 
pace with its competitors, Hankey argued, by spending very little; £5-10 million, he later 
explained, could make a significant difference.26 
If some officials in the Foreign Office did not believe the paper went far enough, those 
that read it in the Treasury—and, to a lesser extent, the Board of Trade—saw it as being wholly 
unrealistic. Senior Foreign Office officials sought to defend the paper’s arguments. The key 
problem, Frederick Hoyer-Miller wrote to a counterpart in the Treasury, is that Britain is 
working to court the Latin American nations through high-level Royal and official visits, but was 
offering far too little in terms of tangible assistance. ‘Whenever a question involving credit for, or 
investment in, Latin America comes up,’ he argued, ‘we have found ourselves compelled to give 
these countries what one could only call least favoured nation treatment.’27 To be sure, the 
Treasury were not entirely unsympathetic. ‘A great deal of what is said in the memorandum,’ one 
official responded, ‘is obviously right.’ However, it went on, ‘it is also saddeningly familiar. I am 
frankly doubtful whether, from the economic standpoint, there is much that Government could 
or ought to be doing to alter the situation…it is certainly a pity that more UK firms do not start 
direct investments in these countries. But their reluctance is understandable given the more 
favourable (and safer) opportunities elsewhere.’28 
A more formal Treasury-Board of Trade response accordingly sought to temper the 
Foreign Office’s enthusiasm. It was, the report noted, undoubtedly unfortunate that British trade 
and investments in Latin America had declined so much from previous highs and the Foreign 
Office, like many British firms and organisations, would like to see this remedied. But, the report 
went on, the ‘extent to which this should be done must be considered not on the basis of our 
past achievements in the area, but of its potential.’ Past successes did not mean that future 
investment would derive identical benefits. Furthermore, there was no scope for utilising 
government funds to bolster UK-Latin American relations. ‘To get a substantial increase in the 
UK share in the Latin American market,’ the report noted, ‘would require an increase in the 
amount of UK investment, public or private, in the continent…in general…our policy and 
commitments, particularly the priority which we give to the Commonwealth, preclude entirely 
the granting of any Government aid to Latin America, or any other non-Commonwealth area 
except in the most exceptional circumstances.’ Increased levels of private investment, it 
conceded, could help to fill this gap; yet the government could do little to encourage this, and 
private capital would go where investors saw the greatest likelihood of substantial returns.29 
Unsurprisingly, the Foreign Office responded in kind. In August they began to try and 
push back against the Treasury’s pessimism. Not only was this stance harming Britain’s 
economic interests, they fumed, but it was also undermining the prospect of being able to 
position the UK as being supportive of the United States ‘Our special position with the US,’ one 
official wrote, ‘depends largely on the extent to which we can be seen to exercise a useful 
influence on the common interest all over the world. We simply cannot afford to abdicate our 
position in such an important part of it as Latin America.’30 Another memo, sent from a high-
level Foreign Office advisor to a counterpart in the Treasury, adopted a more balanced view. 
Clearly, he wrote, Britain’s global commitments had to be taken into account, and greater levels 
of economic assistance could not be sent to Latin America if more pressing concerns—
particularly in the Commonwealth—had already swallowed up the available funds. Nevertheless, 
he continued, the point of circulating the Foreign Office paper had been,  
to emphasize that as we have fallen behind in Latin America, and as Latin America 
has acquired an increased political importance and economic significance for the 
future, a special effort is needed to bring our achievements there on to a par with 
what we are doing in other parts of the world, whether inside the Commonwealth or 
out of it...31  
The Embassy in Washington reaffirmed this stance. ‘In brief, attention to Latin America and 
readiness to co-operate politically as well as to compete commercially with the US in that area,’ 
the Ambassador, Harold Caccia, explained, ‘should, in the next period, be a factor more likely to 
promote closer Anglo-US relations than to become an apple of discord between us.’32 
But the Treasury remained unmoved. As Frank Lee informed Richard Powell, a colleague 
at the Board of Trade, the arguments being made by the Foreign Office did ‘not really challenge 
the broad thesis which dominated our thinking’: ‘namely that a specially mounted campaign on 
behalf of Latin America would involve an unjustifiable diversion of effort and resources from 
other parts of the world.’33 Powell, and his colleagues, agreed. A greater level of British 
involvement would be nice, Powell concurred, but ‘the present situation does not justify any 
change...in such a way as to give Latin America a degree of priority which would cause resources 
to be diverted from other parts of the world.’34 
Not everyone in these departments, however, was opposed to the Foreign Office 
position. In late 1960 a more positive view emerged in a report by Frederick Erroll, the Board of 
Trade Minister, who had toured the area in September. During his tour various officials, 
particularly in Brazil, lobbied him to pursue a more active policy when it came to encouraging 
British firms to invest in the region. Other non-governmental observers, such as the head of the 
Bank of London and South America, were also calling for increased British trade links.35 Erroll’s 
subsequent report, finalised in December, made a clear call for enlarged levels of British trade 
with the area. ‘Why do we put so much effort into working with, and understanding, the alien 
economic systems of Russia and China,’ Errol wrote, ‘when a great continent wants to welcome 
us, and offers us the liberal atmosphere of democracy, individual liberty, and the free enterprise 
way of life?’ ‘It is not too late for Britain to stage a comeback,’ he continued, ‘but there must be 
the political will to do so if our export trade is to expand, and if British investment in South 
America is to grow.’ Moreover, the forthcoming change of government in the US—with John 
Kennedy preparing to replace Eisenhower—might work in Britain’s favour. ‘The USA will 
doubtless continue with massive material aid,’ Erroll wrote, ‘but I am sure more evidence of 
British interest and support in all spheres would be very much welcomed.’36 
These debates highlight two themes that would be of greater importance in the months 
and years that followed. First, it was quite clear that British officials—even those opposed to a 
more sustained effort in Latin America—were broadly in favour of working to try and develop a 
stronger British financial and trade presence in the region if circumstances allowed (though in 
the Treasury’s view, of course, this would be some way in the future). Second, it was also 
apparent that there was a link between British views of the area and the course of US policy. The 
Foreign Office had made more progress in pursuing their arguments when they could point to 
this being likely to find favour with those in Washington and as being of value to the Western 
cause in the Cold War. Eisenhower had heartily backed the idea of Macmillan visiting the area, 
while some advisors believed that the US would welcome European financial assistance in the 
region. As the US position in the area worsened, in fact, the more likely it was that Britain would 
play a larger role. 
These conclusions, and the capacity of Foreign Office officials to make them 
persuasively, strengthened hopes that Britain might be able to expand its stake in the area in the 
years ahead. Shifts in US policy toward the region initiated by the new administration early in 
1961, moreover, would give these arguments an added impetus. Kennedy’s pledge that his 
administration would commit large-scale financial assistance to the task of galvanising Latin 
American development altered the context for British discussions over their own position. Now, 
the prospect of being seen as supporting the US had an additional bite to it. Furthermore, 
attempts to solicit European support, while never a central part of the Alliance, were evident and 
the British would come under growing pressure to back the Washington’s position through a 
more tangible commitment of economic aid—a situation that only increased as the Alliance 
began to come under fire just a year after it was announced. As these arguments gathered pace, 
though, the crucial third element to this decision-making process—that the channelling of funds 
and influence to Latin America be seen as beneficial to the British government—remained 
unaltered and would continue to forestall any attempts to alter British policy. 
**** 
Kennedy announced the Alliance in a speech on March 13, 1961, outlining his administration’s 
goals of ‘redressing the region’s pervasive underdevelopment and inequality and, in the space of 
only a decade, transforming it into a stable, prosperous area.’37 Even before this, however, those 
planning the Alliance had recognised that, at some level, it should have an international 
dimension. One planning report, finalised in the previous winter, recognised that ‘the 
contribution of public capital should come from Western Europe, Canada, and Japan as well as 
from the US.’38 A memo containing suggestions for Kennedy’s speech, meanwhile, had 
recommended that ‘European nations may help in some small measure.’39 Later, during 
discussions for an inter-American meeting to set out the programme’s criteria, a further planning 
memorandum said that the US should ‘encourage other free world countries to provide capital 
and technical assistance.’40 Furthermore, the new administration recognised that the appearance 
of European support would help the administration’s efforts to get necessary appropriations 
passed by Congress. This was likely to be much easier, National Security Council staff member 
Walt Rostow told State Department advisor George Ball, with European—and, in particular, 
British and West German—commitments of aid.41 
This shift in US policy posed a number of questions for British officials. Would the UK 
be more willing to raise its financial presence in the region as a result of the Alliance? 
Irrespective of that, should British interests be shaped by perceptions of their own needs in the 
area or by taking the approach closest to that outlined by Washington? Lastly, what could Britain 
realistically do in the region given its financial constraints? Currying favour through an infusion 
of aid, as highlighted in earlier discussions, was potentially seen as a way of furthering Britain’s 
economic footprint. A further motivation, however, was the ongoing fall-out from the Cuban 
Revolution, which had heightened fears of leftist movements gaining political traction and 
undermining the prevailing system. In the US, similar fears had provided some of the impetus 
for the Alliance; for the British, it had led, in the first instance, to an attempt to try and exert 
diplomatic pressure to promote certain reforms that would nullify the appeal of left-wing 
agendas. Again, British officials found themselves in a multi-faceted situation, whereby their 
interests were partly based on their own goals and economic hopes, their own fears of leftist 
radicalism, and shifting views on whether or not to wholeheartedly back the US.42 
British advisors had continued to debate their position before the AFP’s launch. As 
Harold Caccia reported in late 1960, it was clear that, at some point, the British would need to 
‘explain our position’ on Latin America to the US, but that they should wait until the new 
administration had assumed power.43 Just a few days later, he sent a further missive—recanting 
some of his previous advice and suggesting that it might be possible for London to substantially 
improve its position by making a contribution to the Inter-American Development Bank 
(IADB). Taking this approach, Caccia acknowledged, would place further stresses on Britain’s 
financial position; at the same time, it would provide a ‘very concrete expression of our interest 
in, and desire to help, the economic development of Latin America.’44 
 Even the Foreign Office, however, felt unable to back Caccia’s proposal. One official 
wrote on the front of Caccia’s report that there was surely a risk that it could ‘merely whet Latin 
American appetites and eventually bring us ill-, rather than good-, will.’45 Henry Hankey gave this 
misgiving additional weight shortly afterwards. ‘I fear that our contribution of £10 million spread 
over three years,’ he wrote, ‘might be very unfavourably compared’ with US contributions of 
almost a billion dollars. ‘It is well known that we do not try to compete with the Americans in 
the provision of long-term aid for Latin America,’ Hankey continued, ‘but a disparity of effort so 
great as this seems one to which we should not go out of our way to draw attention.’46 The idea 
that an infusion of aid would prompt Latin American goodwill was also challenged. ‘I have no 
doubt that we should get credit from the US for a contribution of £10 million to the IADB,’ 
another Foreign Office official wrote, ‘but I think the effect in Latin America would be virtually 
nil.’47 
 Ultimately, this led the Foreign Office to reject Caccia’s suggestion. ‘I am afraid that we 
are convinced that it is not a starter,’ they told him in reply. ‘We are all very doubtful whether we 
should in fact get much mileage out of it. £10 million…would be a drop in the ocean compared 
to the American contribution of $450 million’ and the ‘Latin Americans might indeed resent a 
UK contribution on political grounds (in view of our status as a colonial power).’48 This reponse 
starkly exposed the limitations that the British faced in the region. The Foreign Office had been 
the cheerleaders for an expanded British position in 1960, yet they also recognised that the sort 
of money that London could actually afford to spend would have only a limited impact. Support 
for a stronger presence in the region remained evident, therefore, but the likelihood of achieving 
this remained slight. Just as importantly, it was proving difficult to find an approach that aligned 
all three of the interests underpinning British policy. What worked in terms of bolstering Anglo-
American relations, the discussions over Caccia’s proposal revealed, did not necessarily benefit 
the position of the West in the Cold War or accord with London’s financial self-interest. 
By May there was little sign of any shift in this approach, particularly in Parliament. The 
problem, one MP noted during a debate about where Britain’s limited funds should be spent, 
was in determining which areas had greatest claim. ‘One has this perpetual problem—one cannot 
help it,’ the Member of Parliament explained to the Commons, ‘of deciding whether South-East 
Asia is more important than Africa, or whether Africa is more important than Latin America.’49 
Similarly, after a further debate on foreign aid, a question was submitted asking what assistance 
Britain gave to Latin America and why. The government’s response, delivered by a young Ted 
Heath, was evasive. Britain, he said, made ‘substantial contributions to international 
organisations which provide assistance to Latin America.’50  
Wariness about hewing too closely to the American line also militated against any 
wholehearted commitment to signing-up to support the Alliance. Early appraisals of the Alliance, 
indeed, were far from enthusiastic. In June a pessimistic appraisal was sent from the Embassy in 
Washington, in which the author noted his reluctance to ‘make any prediction from here on the 
chances of long term success.’ True, he noted, it was encouraging that the US was seeking to do 
something in Latin America; nevertheless, the ‘major tests’ were still to come. ‘Congress is in an 
aggressive mood and more determined than ever to prevent American aid from ending up as air 
conditioned Cadillacs, swimming pools and military support for corrupt oligarchies,’ the report 
explained. ‘Much will therefore depend on how far the Latin American governments are 
prepared to pull their weight...on whether the Americans can avoid damaging their own idealistic 
programme by tactlessness and clumsiness in execution.’51 
Strong arguments not to expand the British role in the area, therefore, remained evident 
by the early summer of 1961 and it is clear that finding common ground between the different 
elements within British policy was proving difficult. At this point, though, the nature of British 
discussions began to change—and, slowly but surely, the Foreign Office view began to gain far 
more traction in Whitehall as concerns about the Cold War and the desire to side more openly 
with the United States became more important to British officials. 
A number of reasons can be identified in the historical record to explain this change. 
Firstly, the desire to cultivate closer relations with the United States remained a key part of 
British policy. As Kennedy’s briefing notes for a meeting with Macmillan in Bermuda in late 
1961 made clear: ‘The Prime Minister’s main purpose is to keep you his best friend.’52 Secondly, 
the Cold War appeared to be entering a more dangerous phase in the early 1960s. Kennedy’s 
relationship with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev had got off to an inauspicious start, while the 
stand-off over Berlin, mounting tensions in Southeast Asia, and ongoing difficulties in Cuba, all 
pointed to a worsening in east-west relations in 1961.53 Finally, Foreign Office officials, as they 
had with respect to Southeast Asia in the late 1940s, recognised that framing the issue in Cold 
War terms could help them to gain the support of other departments. If increasing the British 
role in Latin America was seen to have Cold War implications it would be deemed a matter of 
greater importance.54 Together, these factors led to a shift in the tone of British debates and gave 
the Foreign Office a greater capacity to drive the discussions.  
Evidence of this change came in the autumn of 1961 when recommendations for an 
expanded British role in the Western Hemisphere emerged with renewed vigour. ‘Despite the 
unfavourable climate for requesting additional overseas funds of any kind from the Treasury,’ a 
Foreign Office report began, ‘the case for extending technical assistance to Latin America is a 
very strong one…if the major part of Latin America is to be kept on the side of the West during 
the next ten years, these countries will require economic aid and technical assistance on a 
massive scale.’ Consequently, there was a growing need for greater British assistance. ‘Both the 
US Government and our allies in Western Europe have been reaching the conclusion in recent 
months that a joint US-Western European effort is needed to shoulder the Latin American 
burden.’55 The Treasury, of course, remained unmoved. ‘Our resources are so stretched,’ they 
responded, ‘that we cannot include Latin America in our plans for future assistance.’56  
However, the Foreign Office’s argument now seemed more persuasive; in particular, the 
Cabinet Office responded favourably to calls to create a new high-level committee on Latin 
America. In a memo specifically designed to court Cabinet Office support, Foreign Office 
official Frederick Hoyer-Millar painted a bleak picture of Latin America’s prospects. ‘In the past 
year or so,’ he wrote, ‘Latin America has become one of the principal targets of the Sino-Soviet 
bloc in the Cold War. Unless both the US and the Western European Governments are prepared 
to make a concerted effort (not exclusively economic in nature), there is a serious danger that 
much of Latin America may be lost to the west by 1970.’ It was now imperative, Hoyer-Millar 
continued, that Britain back the Alliance. ‘Latin America as a whole is likely to confront us in 
future with a series of politico-economic problems...which seem to merit joint consideration by 
departments at higher level than has been the custom in the past.’57 
 Again, the Treasury objected.58 Their view was expressed most clearly by its Permanent 
Secretary, Frank Lee. ‘I can see no prospect in the immediate future of our being able to find 
money for the countries of South America,’ he explained in a riposte to the Cabinet Office. ‘For 
this reason I am against setting up any such committee at present.’59 For the first time since 1959, 
though, the Treasury position did not prevail. In early 1962, Norman Brook, the Secretary of the 
Cabinet Office, wrote to the Foreign Office and informed them that Hoyer-Millar’s proposals 
had ‘been generally welcomed’ and that the ‘arrangements to establish the new Committee will 
be made as soon as possible.’60 In explaining the decision to Lee, Brook stressed that he ‘did not 
ignore’ Lee’s objections and, indeed, recognised that there was ‘no immediate prospect’ of 
finding any money. Nevertheless, he continued, ‘I am sure that there are other things to think 
about in relation to Latin America besides aid; and we cannot altogether exclude the possibility 
that aid priorities may change.’61 The formation of this new Committee did not mark a major 
shift in terms of policy, but it did point to the fact that, in Whitehall, British officials were now 
more persuaded of the Foreign Office’s line on Latin America than they had previously been. 
Prominent backing for the idea, meanwhile, came from the Duke of Edinburgh after he 
undertook an official visit to the region in spring 1962. British businesses, he told a group of 
leading industrialists upon his return, could derive great benefit from investing in Latin America 
if only they could only grasp the opportunities that existed there.62  
A wider acceptance of Latin America’s Cold War importance had seemingly made a 
difference. A significant challenge, however, remained for those officials advocating greater UK 
involvement in Latin America: the need to demonstrate that this stance was compatible with US 
interests and, crucially, that it was seen as being a worthwhile use of British capital. 
**** 
As the Foreign Office position started to gain further traction, the Alliance for Progress was 
coming in for increasing criticism in the US and in Latin America. Indeed, the Alliance seemed 
to be coming under fire from all sides—from Congress, who were wary about signing-off on 
such large amounts of expenditure, from the Press, who saw little in the way of progress toward 
meeting the AFP’s ambitious goals, from the Latin Americans, who were much less enthusiastic 
about it than the administration had expected them to be, and from critics within the 
administration, who believed the project was flawed and who were unimpressed by the 
credentials of those Kennedy had nominated to run it.63 A report by the Bureau of the Budget in 
the summer of 1962 captured the extent of these gloomy appraisals. ‘Our observations are not 
reassuring,’ the report explained. ‘It appears to us that US policies and programs are in a state of 
considerable disarray…there is a wide gap between Alliance concepts and practice.’64 
 British assessments were little better. At a conference of the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
a British report noted that, in recent years, the Latin American ‘economic position has turned 
acutely for the worse’65 and that the ‘Alliance for Progress has unquestionably run into stormy 
seas.’66 This, coupled with the fact that British observers were fearful that their European 
competitors were rapidly moving ahead in the region, seemed to point in the direction of 
supporting a change in British policy.67  
 However, any sense of a clear resolution remained out of reach. And while some 
progress had indeed been made since the initial discussions in 1959, there was a long way to go 
before the British government was persuaded that it should expand its presence in the region. At 
this point, additional impetus for a shift in British thinking began to emerge as a result of direct 
requests from US emissaries for greater British participation in the Alliance and from the 
growing acceptance among British officials that US policy was in trouble.  
 Across the spring and summer of 1962, the Foreign Office asked its missions in Latin 
America to report back on the Alliance’s progress. In general, a summary of these reports noted, 
any overview of the AFP was certain to ‘present a fairly gloomy picture.’ However, it went on, 
there were a number of ‘extenuating circumstances’—such as the general concept of the Alliance 
being ‘sound’, the necessity of US involvement in any major aid programme in the region, and 
the fact that the AFP, in spite of everything else, had compelled governments across the area ‘to 
pay at least lip service to the concepts of social and economic reform.’ Britain, the report noted, 
‘should not be too quick to condemn the Alliance’ as it was ‘likely for the foreseeable future to 
dominate the field of Western aid to Latin America.’ London, it concluded, should be ‘prepared 
publicly to support the aims and objectives of the Alliance as well as coordinate our own aid with 
it so far as we consider this to be practicable.’68 
 The key word here was the last one—practicable. No matter how keen the Foreign 
Office was to extend Britain’s role in the region, if the Treasury said there was no money any 
support would be limited to a verbal endorsement of the Alliance. The desire to back the US 
position and bolster the West’s position in the Cold War, no matter how strong, could not fix 
economic realities. Pressure from the US, however, was starting to mount and compelled British 
analysts to think more carefully about what, specifically, they could look to achieve in Latin 
America. In September, Teodoro Moscoso, Kennedy’s choice to run the AFP, met with the 
British Ambassador in Bolivia and asked him directly whether ‘Britain, Germany and France 
were willing to “join the Alliance”.’ Britain, the Ambassador reported to the Foreign Office, 
would be well advised to tread cautiously. Technical assistance, he wrote in a telegram, was more 
likely to benefit the UK and any tie-in with the Alliance would ‘take time to work out’ while the 
‘present scale of our financial assistance to Latin America is so small as to make the question of 
integrating it into the Alliance appear faintly ludicrous.’69 
 Not everyone agreed. An official from the Overseas Development Institute, who had 
recently toured the region and also spoken with Moscoso, suggested that Anglo-American 
relations compelled Britain to support the AFP. 
The US needs outside help in dealing with the Hemisphere, and will resent the failure 
of its allies to provide it. In our turn we need American help in the Commonwealth, 
where the US is in fact the major supplier of aid…Britain might join the Alliance for 
Progress… it is not an absurd proposition: we are bound to be approached for aid to 
South America, we might as well be involved in the policy-making.70 
For the time being, the Foreign Office agreed with the Ambassador in La Paz. The Alliance 
‘deserves British support’, one official wrote, but ‘economic considerations do not permit us to 
give large-scale financial assistance…we should therefore concentrate on technical assistance—a 
cheap way of reaping considerable benefits.’71 
 Problems in Washington, though, were increasing the pressure on London. The Kennedy 
administration’s bid for increased aid appropriations, the Embassy reported in September, was 
being given a rough ride by Congress and ‘the best that could be hoped for’ was that the Senate 
would force through a less debilitating cut.72 Ongoing problems in securing the necessary funds 
to meet expanding aid commitments, meanwhile, heightened the US view that they were 
shouldering too much of the burden. George Ball, a State Department official concerned with 
Europe, informed Kennedy that US balance of payment problems, which had been a cause for 
growing concern, only existed because ‘we are carrying a disproportionately large share of the 
Free World’s burdens.’73 Indeed, Kennedy was due to make this very point to a meeting of 
European financial ministers where, one of his advisors instructed him, he should make it clear 
that ‘during the period when they were unable to make any contribution we willingly carried the 
whole load alone…we do not remind others of this in order to earn their gratitude, but simply to 
point out that we bore the responsibility when we could, and if others do not join when they can 
and we can no longer do it all, our common security will be impaired.’74 
 The most overt request for European and British participation in the AFP followed 
shortly afterwards, in December 1962, when Macmillan was visited by New York Senator, Jacob 
Javits (R-NY). A long-standing proponent of Atlantic partnership, Javits was firmly behind the 
US mission to foster economic development in Latin America (a mission that now seemed more 
urgent following the events of the Cuban Missile Crisis in October).75 Prior to his arrival in 
London, Javits had chaired a meeting of the Economic Committee of the NATO 
Parliamentarians Conference that had recognised the ‘need for a greater acceleration of the 
economic development of Latin America under the Alliance for Progress’ and, more importantly, 
stated the participants’ agreement ‘that all of the nations of the Atlantic Community should join 
in the task now undertaken through the Alliance for Progress...’76  
During his meeting with Macmillan, Javits outlined a proposal. Together with the OAS, 
the OECD, and the IADB, Javits said, there should be a joint US-European funding plan for 
Latin America. ‘The immediate plan,’ he explained, ‘was that there should be a broad conference 
in America which Europe would join as givers, not only of money, but also of experience and 
techniques. There would be participation by European private enterprise and US private 
enterprise, although the US Government would not participate because they already had the 
Alliance for Progress.’ For the US, this would help to stave off the problems posed by the flight 
of Latin American private capital that had emerged as a consequence of Washington’s insistence 
on internal economic reforms. For the Europeans, Javits concluded, the advantages were that:  
a) this was something which Europe could do for the US and which the US ardently 
desired; b) it would be a really useful practical exercise for OECD which at the 
moment was a rather theoretical body; c) it would give Europe a new area in which 
to interest itself and might help to take the minds of the Europeans off the 
negotiations between the UK and the EEC.77 
 Responses to the Javits Plan (as British officials came to call it) were relatively favourable: 
it could help to alleviate Latin American pressure on Europe over the EEC, while it could also 
provide Britain with a financial way into the region that accorded with American goals of 
diversifying the AFP.78 Conscious of the limits on their financial resources, however, British 
officials also had to weigh up what kind of commitment they might be agreeing to. ‘Plans are 
afoot for Europe to come to the aid of the ailing Alliance for Progress,’ the Financial Times noted 
in the wake of Javits’ visit. ‘Senator Jacob K. Javits sketched out a scheme whereby members of 
the OECD would mount something in the nature of the Marshall Plan for Latin America.’79 The 
debates that took place after the Javits trip were thus symptomatic of those that had been 
ongoing since 1959: though there was a broad base of support for the idea of extending Britain’s 
role in Latin America, financial concerns and the exact nature of its relationship with the US 
continued to affect British judgements, and aligning the competing interests guiding British 
discussions remained frustratingly out of reach. 
**** 
British officials had been convinced of Latin America’s importance to the western cause in the 
Cold War throughout the discussions that had taken place since 1959. Now, with the Alliance in 
trouble and US requests for a greater British and European role in the area increasing in 
frequency, officials in London could also make a convincing argument by the start of 1963 that a 
change in policy would also benefit Anglo-American relations. The missing piece, however, 
remained the economic dimension of the problem. Put simply, could Britain afford to adopt a 
more engaged approach toward the region and would this prove to be of sufficient benefit to 
make it a worthwhile risk? 
 It was a concern that continued to shape British discussions in 1963. The Javits Plan, one 
Foreign Office advisor cautioned, could be the start of a substantial US effort to enlist greater 
European support for the AFP. And though there were undoubtedly many ‘cogent political 
arguments’ in favour of this, the government’s lack of capital, plus continuing disagreements 
between the Foreign Office and the Treasury, made any wholesale embracement of this 
unlikely.80 Other officials, though, were more positive. ‘It is clearly in our interest that the 
Alliance succeeds,’ one official countered. ‘I wonder, therefore, whether we should change our 
tactics and ask the Treasury (if not the Cabinet) to agree to our providing, say, £10m to be 
spread over two years for the Alliance for Progress.’81 Unsurprisingly, a note of caution remained 
in evidence. ‘It may be that American Department consider that we should give the Javits 
proposal a fair wind for the sake of Anglo-US relations,’ another Foreign Office official opined, 
‘but I am inclined to doubt whether we should earn more political kudos in Latin America by 
channelling a lump sum to the continent via the OAS.’82 
 Slowly but surely, then, the obstacles to a larger British role were being overcome. The 
key consideration, and the argument that provided the best lever for encouraging a change in 
policy, was the desire to align London more closely with Washington in order to boost US-UK 
relations. A further consideration, though, was that Britain’s continued exclusion from the EEC 
raised the possibility that London might be excluded from any European contribution to the 
Alliance. It was the first of these arguments, though, which provided the strongest pull for 
British officials—a fact that had been powerfully reaffirmed during preparations for an Anglo-
American Conference on Latin America to be held at Ditchley Park in early 1963. In response to 
all of this, the Foreign Office sent a proposal to the Cabinet Office in March 1963 that set out a 
call for a change in British policy that was much clearer than previous iterations and which made 
a powerful case for supporting the Alliance and the US. 
...The only hope lies in positive action; and the only such action which looks like 
being effective is the Alliance for Progress. It is becoming increasingly clear that this 
programme involves financial liabilities which are beyond the resources even of the 
US. Nor is it only a question of financial resources. One of the major obstacles to the 
success of the Alliance for Progress is its exclusively US origin. If it can be shown 
that the Alliance is a genuinely multilateral effort and not simply US aid under a new 
name, its chances of success will be greatly enhanced...The US administration are 
strongly in favour of greater European cooperation in the development of Latin 
America, and consider that Europe has in Latin America a position not unlike that 
occupied by the US in Africa (ie non-colonial past)...It is recommended therefore 
that:- we should seek an appropriation of, say, £10 million to be spread over three 
years, for development aid to Latin America countries as part of a larger European 
effort to help the Alliance for Progress.83 
This proposal, far stronger and much more specific than those seen previously, was 
markedly similar to the final agreement from the aforementioned meeting at Ditchley Park. The 
final agreement of the Conference was, in effect, an unambiguous statement of US-UK 
cooperation in Latin America.  
The conference unanimously agreed that the future of the Latin American countries 
and their continuing and developing association with the other countries of the Free 
World was of the highest importance to the US and the UK, and indeed to other 
like-minded counties of the West. They felt it was increasingly important that these 
latter countries should do all in their power to assist the Latin American countries in 
their plans for social, economic and political development.84  
But if the Foreign Office now felt able to move forcefully on this issue they were a long 
way from winning the argument. Agreement had been reached on the issues of the importance 
of the area to the West and the idea that a change in policy would boost Anglo-American 
relations. The economic case, however, had not yet been made. Substantial opposition remained 
within the Treasury to the entire notion of British participation in the Alliance. ‘It is doubtful,’ 
one official wrote after reading the Foreign Office memorandum, ‘how far we ought to support 
the Alliance for Progress, as such, with cash.’ If the Latin American nations would ‘take the steps 
necessary to pursue the objectives of the Alliance wholeheartedly or to mobilise their own 
resources at all effectively,’ he went on, ‘the need for European capital would be much 
reduced.’85 Nor did Treasury officials completely accept the Foreign Office line that the position 
of the West in the Cold War was at stake or that an Anglo-American mutuality of interests 
necessitated British support. ‘I think the Foreign Office sometimes tend to exaggerate the 
dangers of the continent going communist on the one hand,’ a further report argued, ‘and to 
exaggerate the curative powers of an Alliance for Progress on the other...Fundamentally, where 
Latin America is concerned, whatever developments may take place in other fields, our interests 
are much more like those of the other European countries than they are like those of the US.’86 
The enduring nature of this division between the Treasury and the Foreign Office was 
exemplified by a clash over the minutes of a meeting of the Cabinet Office’s Latin American 
Committee (LAC) in March 1963. After seeing the draft version of the minutes, the Treasury 
protested that they gave ‘rather more weight to the Foreign Office views which were expressed 
than to the doubts which, I think it fair to say, the rest of us felt about their suggestion.’87 A 
revised version was subsequently produced that noted that, while British financial support in 
Latin America was certainly desirable, the ‘present shortage of resources made this extremely 
difficult.’88  
By the spring of 1963, then, British deliberations over Latin America had still not 
managed to reach a consensus for a shift in policy. Support for an increased British financial 
presence in the region remained strong, but perennial doubts over Britain’s financial stability, the 
extent to which supporting the AFP suited British interests, and the necessity of pursuing a 
Commonwealth-first approach to foreign aid, continued to block any decisive action. This, as a 
report in The Observer noted, was symptomatic of a lack of public and political discussion over the 
role that aid should play in British foreign policy. ‘There is no national political debate at all,’ the 
report noted, ‘comparable to that which takes place in deciding how much of our resources to 
devote to defence.’89 
The situation was cogently expressed in a Foreign Office memorandum following the 
Anglo-American Conference. Britain, it stated, should ‘continue its support of the Alliance for 
Progress and its ideals and purpose…and it should consider what steps it can take to increase the 
size and effectiveness of that support’; but, it went on, this had to be weighed against wider 
British interests. At this point, indeed, doubts were again emerging as to whether British 
participation would benefit the US and the wider West. 
Many posts have expressed concern at the degree of identification of British aid with 
the Alliance for Progress which we propose, since they argue that the small packets 
of aid and technical assistance that Britain can provide Latin America are not 
sufficient to dilute the North American origin of the Alliance in Latin American eyes, 
and that we are therefore pursuing a policy detrimental to British national interests, 
particularly commercial, in Latin America, without being of any assistance to the 
Americans…90 
Yet if practicalities such as these continued to forestall any major change in policy, 
evidence was increasingly emerging of a growing attitudinal shift among officials in Whitehall. In 
particular, officials began to believe that the traditional sticking point—that Britain could not 
afford to invest anything in the region due to pre-existing commitments elsewhere—was no 
longer as problematic as it had previously been. There were even signs that the fundamental 
belief the Commonwealth must come first was starting to weaken. ‘Some of our aid, and an 
increasing amount in the last year or so,’ Conservative MP Robert Carr noted in a Commons 
debate in the spring of 1963, ‘goes to foreign countries unconnected with the Commonwealth. 
We are beginning for the first time, for example, to play a small but real part in Latin America.’91 
Similarly, there was also a detailed discussion over whether or not Britain should make a 
contribution to aid programmes in Central America that would not have got off the ground in 
1961. Most notable in this respect was the fact that the Bank of England’s opposition to this 
proposal—which previously had been along similar lines to that of the Treasury—was based on 
practical, rather than financial, objections.92  
Tellingly, the Treasury was now starting to espy potential economic benefits in the 
region—not least because of the fact that London’s European competitors were increasing their 
stakes there to seemingly good effect. ‘The fact that the [European] Community are showing an 
interest in Latin America,’ one Treasury official wrote to another, ‘suggests that we, too, ought to 
be studying the problems involved and generally reviewing our policies towards that part of the 
world.’93 The US, meanwhile, also continued to exert significant pressure on its European allies. 
In July, the US Ambassador to NATO reported on recent efforts to encourage European 
participation in the Alliance, noting that the possible advantages to the US were that it would 
‘serve as concrete evidence (a) we really want them (Europeans to) participate fully in AFP, with 
voice in key decision-making instrumentality, and not just their money; (b) we are serious about 
need for increasing appropriate types public sector capital flows.’94  
And while these solicitations were not going to result in a wholehearted pledge of 
assistance, there was now a groundswell of opinion that backed some kind of increased British 
role as, at long last, the three elements in Whitehall’s decision-making began to coalesce.  The 
region’s importance to the West had never really been doubted; now, for the first time, a 
majority of officials believed that Anglo-American relations could also be improved alongside 
the pursuit of London’s own economic objectives. As a Foreign Office memo made clear shortly 
after Macmillan’s replacement by Alec Douglas-Home, Britain should work alongside the US in 
Latin America but also seek to ensure that its own goals were met. 
We must help Latin America not by working jointly with the US but in parallel, in 
visible but friendly independence…such stablilizing efforts should be aimed 
primarily at keeping Latin America in the western camp, but we need not be ashamed 
of our own economic profit motive. We should not expect gratitude, but there is no 
reason why we should not earn a bit of cash while helping Latin America to 
advance.95 
This version of cooperation was expressed to Thomas Mann, Lyndon Johnson’s leading Latin 
American advisor, by the British Ambassador in Washington shortly after Labour leader, Harold 
Wilson, had defeated Douglas-Home in the 1964 election. ‘I said that there had recently been a 
considerable increase in interest in Latin America in the UK in the political, economic and 
cultural fields,’ the Ambassador later reported to London. ‘This was reflected in our decision to 
extend our aid programmes in the area which, although small in comparison with the US effort, 
were, we believed, of value.’96  
**** 
By 1964 there was enough convergence between the different elements underpinning British 
decision-making to make a more proactive stance toward Latin America possible. To be sure, 
this did not result in a sea-change in British policy; London would continue to advance 
cautiously and any notable infusions of aid would take time to emerge. Nevertheless, a shift in 
British thinking was now evident and highlighted the evolving perspectives that policymakers in 
the UK had of Britain’s place in the world. As the Commonwealth’s importance began to erode, 
the opportunities to expand elsewhere became more attractive and, in financial terms, more 
affordable. This was the crucial point in British deliberations. From 1959 onwards, the area had 
been of increasing interest to officials in Whitehall and was seen as one where it furthered the 
position of the West in the Cold War to develop closer relations. As we have seen, however, this 
was not enough to prompt a more expansive British position. No shift could be countenanced, 
indeed, unless it was seen as being largely compatible with Anglo-American relations and in 
Britain’s economic interests. 
Increasingly, US solicitations of British support for the Alliance for Progress after 1961 
made it clear that a larger presence would be welcome and would not be seen as a threat to 
Washington’s own interests. This did not initiate an immediate response, but it did make a 
change in British policy more likely. Moreover, this only increased as time went on: Macmillan 
had prioritised improving transatlantic ties, while Britain’s recurrent financial problems—
culminating, in 1964, 1965 and 1966, with requests to Washington for emergency fiscal 
assistance—ensured that there would never be too much independence in British actions.97 If the 
US wanted a more substantive British role it was certainly something that London would 
consider.  
 Still, no change in policy would be possible unless it was believed to be affordable and 
of benefit to British interests—and it was this issue that was at the heart of the ongoing dispute 
between the Treasury and the Foreign Office. Here, British officials ran into the perpetual 
dilemma of whether they prioritised the so-called special relationship with the United States or 
their own financial and strategic goals.98 If necessary, of course, London had demonstrated that it 
would pursue its own goals even if these were at odds with the US. This had been illustrated in 
Cuba, where Britain refused to cede to pressure from Washington to cut bus sales to Castro’s 
government despite the hostility of the Johnson administration.99 Ideally, though, the British 
wanted to chart a way forward that allowed them to pursue their own goals in a manner that was 
amenable to the White House. 
Hence, it was only in 1963 that these competing issues were aligned enough to enable a 
more engaged stance toward the region to take shape, and only in 1964 and the years afterwards 
that officials in Whitehall began to consider more closely what they might do in the region. The 
evolving position was summarised by Harold Caccia, in a memo he wrote urging the Cabinet 
Office not to disband its Latin American Committee. 
Whether we like it or not, Latin America is going to claim an increasing share of our 
attention. Other countries in Western Europe are beginning to realise that the US 
cannot be left to deal single-handed with the task of preserving Latin America from 
totalitarianism on the one hand and anarchy on the other. There is a much greater 
readiness than before to regard this as a common problem and to seek a solution in 
concert. It is important for our relations not only with Latin America but also with 
Europe that we should not be left out of this movement…Side by side with this 
resurgence of European interest, our own effort in Latin America is steadily 
expanding in terms of technical assistance, development aid, information and 
culture.100 
Caccia proved prescient. In 1966, Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart reported on a tour 
of the region to Wilson’s cabinet. ‘It was clear that there was much for the United Kingdom to 
do in order to make up ground that had been lost commercially in Latin America over recent 
decades,’ Stewart told them.101 Later, it was reported that Britain had agreed to provide £4 
million worth of developmental funding in the region, an agreement that the Embassy in 
Washington announced ‘represents an important demonstration of British support for the 
Alliance for Progress…[and] offers renewed evidence of Britain’s heightened interest in Latin 
America’, while the president of the Board of Trade affirmed in the Commons that, in light of 
West German and Japanese advances, the issue of increasing trade in the region was at the 
‘forefront of our minds.’102 Finally, a statement on British policy towards Latin America, 
prepared by the Foreign Secretary in June 1966, made it clear that the region was now seen to be 
one of significant importance. If the West had any hopes of modernising the developing world, 
Latin America was crucial; if Britain had any hopes of exerting any leadership on this front—
even, in some cases, criticising the US—this was also true. He concluded by setting out three 
principles that should guide UK policy in the years to come: 
(a) It is an important British interest that Latin America should remain in the free 
world and that we should do what we can to help the Latin Americans to achieve 
self-sustaining growth in freedom as quickly as possible;  
(b) It is equally in our interest in the long term to increase our share of the growing 
Latin American market; 
(c) Both these interests require a more active British presence in the political, cultural 
and, above all, the economic field; greater priority therefore needs to be given both 
to Latin America in general and in particular to selected countries in the area.103 
The position set out by Stewart had grown out of the debates that took place between 1959 and 
1963, and demonstrates the enduring nature of this trifurcated framework that had shaped 
British thinking. It had taken a long time for the different elements informing British policy to be 
in line with one another; once this happened it took a similarly long time for this to translate into 
a visible change in policy. It was a process, moreover, which highlights the fact that British policy 
in this period, particularly toward an area of the world not typically considered as being vital to 
the UK, was shaped by more than the exigencies of the Cold War or the desire of British 
officials to forge closer relations with the United States. Both undoubtedly played their part, as 
we have seen, yet so, too, did the desire among advisors in Whitehall to shape British policy in a 
way that was cost-effective and, above all, financially beneficial.  
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